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Abstract
Important features of space and time are taken to be missing in
quantum gravity, allegedly requiring an explanation of the emergence
of spacetime from non-spatio-temporal theories. In this paper, we
argue that the explanatory gap between general relativity and non-
spatio-temporal quantum gravity theories might significantly be re-
duced with two moves. First, we point out that spacetime is already
partially missing in the context of general relativity when understood
from a dynamical perspective. Second, we argue that most approaches
to quantum gravity already start with an in-built distinction between
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1 Introduction
In the recent literature, much has been written on the emergence
of spacetime and spatio-temporal theories from non-spatio-temporal
theories in the context of quantum gravity (cf. for instance Huggett
and Wu¨thrich (2013), Crowther (2016)). In this essay, we discuss the
extent to which this so-called emergence of spacetime is as radical
as has been claimed. We will argue in favor of two claims. First,
contrary to what is often said, namely that spacetime emerges from a
non-spatio-temporal structure, many of these cases might be described
as the emergence of non-spatio-temporal structures from distinct non-
spatio-temporal structures because spacetime, in a substantive sense,
is already missing in General Relativity (GR hereafter). Second, we
argue that in many research programs on Quantum Gravity (QG from
now on), a local distinction between a spatial or quasi-spatial structure
on the one hand, and a temporal or quasi-temporal on the other hand,
is still implemented. With the expressions “quasi-spatial” and “quasi-
temporal” structures, we generically mean structures that respectively
share features of space and time but do not implement all of the
features usually attributed to them.
More precisely, we argue that the fundamental structure replac-
ing spacetime in QG approaches still contains a distinction between
quasi-spatial and quasi-temporal elements at the level of its most ba-
sic constituents (for instance, at the level of nodes and/or edges for a
graph-like fundamental structure) and that, therefore, spacetime, in
a minimal sense, is still there in QG—indeed, we take the existence
of a local split between quasi-space and quasi-time to justify the ex-
istence of a minimal spacetime, associated with the existence of such
a local split. Taken together, these two claims entail that spacetime
may be regarded as already partially missing in GR, and as still par-
tially present in QG, narrowing the explanatory gap between the two
theories and questioning the relevance of describing the relation be-
tween GR and QG as entailing that GR spacetime emerges from a
non-spatio-temporal QG structure. As a terminological convention,
we will refer to this partial spacetime as “minimal spacetime”, be-
ing granted that this is a matter of convention to which extent this
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structure should be called “spacetime” or not.
What do we mean exactly by “explanatory gap”? Following Le Bi-
han (2018), it is useful to introduce a distinction between the hard
problem of spacetime emergence and the the easy problem of space-
time emergence. The hard problem is to understand the ontological
status of the two structures at play (the fundamental and the deriva-
tive structures) and the nature of the relation obtaining between the
two structures: Are these two structures real, one of them being more
fundamental than the other, or is the derivative structure a pure illu-
sion, an approximate description of the fundamental structure without
an ontological counterpart? The easy problem consists in finding the
formal derivation of the derivative theory by using mathematical tools
and bridge principles between the primitive notions involved in both
theories.1 We then define the “explanatory gap” between the two
theories as the conceptual discrepancy between the primitive notions
involved in the two theories. For instance, admitting that the easy
problem was convincingly addressed in the case of QG, one could ask
how we should interpret the primitive notions of the derivative theory
(GR), allegedly relying on the existence of spacetime, if these are very
different from the primitive notions of the fundamental theory (QG),
which are potentially non-spatio-temporal.
Note that in this essay we do not take a position on whether there
genuinely is a hard problem of spacetime. One may indeed argue that
there is no hard problem of spacetime because the derivative theory
(GR) does not describe a genuinely existing structure, just as one
may deny that there is a hard problem of consciousness by denying
the existence of consciousness. However in this scenario one still has
to explain why it is the case that there is no hard problem of spacetime
(see e.g. Chalmers (2018) for a defense of this point in the context of
the philosophy of mind). In a nutshell, if one argues that the physical
system described by GR is not real in such a way that there is no hard
problem of spacetime, the ontological hard problem of spacetime will
be deflated. Nonetheless, the more general hard problem of space-
time will not be solved because we still have to understand why this
approximation (the structure described by GR), rather than another
one, describes the world. Compare this situation with the one we find
in philosophy of mind: It is not because we solve the hard problem of
consciousness by stipulating that there are no mental states that the
problem is fully solved. We still have to explain why we do have the
1We keep the name “easy” in analogy with the terminology in the philosophy of mind,
with a touch of humor. The easy problem of spacetime relies on finding a theory of quan-
tum gravity and relating it to GR, which arguably is one of the most difficult challenges
ever met by physicists.
3
illusion that there are mental states, and therefore, explain why we
are lured into believing that there is a hard problem of consciousness
in the first place.
Therefore, in this essay, we try to solve the hard problem of space-
time by narrowing the conceptual discrepancy between the primitive
notions of GR and the primitive notions of QG. On the one hand, if you
believe that there is no hard problem of spacetime in the first place,
our approach helps to explain why this is so by narrowing the concep-
tual discrepancy between the two sets of primitive notions. On the
other hand, if you do accept that there is a hard problem of spacetime
if there is a conceptual discrepancy between the two sets of primitive
notions, our narrowing of this conceptual discrepancy also helps to
make the problem less salient. As we will go on to explain, we may
narrow the conceptual discrepancy by endorsing the “dynamical ap-
proach”to GR, which entails that the spatiotemporality of the metric
field is physically contingent, and/or by acknowledging that the fun-
damental structure described by the various theories of QG already
relies on a distinction between structures that maps into the space-
time split present in GR. Indeed, the two moves presented in order to
narrow the explanatory gap stand independently.2 For instance, the
reader who does not accept that the dynamical approach is consistent
may accept the point about quantum gravity, and vice versa.
Here is a more precise description of the two moves. First, space-
time may be construed as already partially missing in the framework
of GR. In fact, according to the dynamical approach, the chronogeo-
metric nature of the metric field (or to put it differently, its spatiotem-
porality) is contingent on its coupling to other matter fields, entailing
that the spatiotemporality of the metric does not obtain in all possi-
ble worlds that are described by GR. This contingency of spacetime
deflates in part the common concept of spacetime as a necessary struc-
ture and, as a result, spacetime can be regarded as a derivative result
of, a specific and contingent configuration of the metric field. Given
the dynamical approach, we (only) need to derive GR with its met-
ric field from QG—not the full-blown spatiotemporality of the metric
field.3
Second, we find that a split between space and time still obtains in
the fundamental structures described by QG approaches either in the
form of (representations of) the Lorentz symmetry, or along another
principle playing the same role in the theory. As we will argue, if
2With a small caveat, to be explained in the conclusion.
3We will explain later why we take the contingency of the spatiotemporality of the
metric field—a particular consequence of the dynamical approach—to deflate partly its
spatiotemporality.
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one takes the local differentiation between space and time to be a
minimal and essential feature of (minimal) spacetime, then (minimal)
spacetime has not been lost on the way.
Three last introductory remarks are in order. First, we do believe
that QG exhibits intriguing features, missing in GR and vice versa
(see section 3.3 for a list of decisive differences in features of GR and
QG: classicality vs. superposition, continuity vs. discreteness, locality
vs. disordered locality/non-locality). Our point in this essay is not
that there is no interesting problem of emergence of spacetime, but
rather that the two theories related by a relation of emergence may
be regarded as being spatio-temporal in a minimal sense.
Second, we want to situate our claim in a more general context.
In order to explain the phenomenology of space and time, namely
our ordinary experience of space and time, we believe that a two-
step strategy is fruitful: (1) Relating the phenomenology of space and
time to the ontology described by GR and, (2) filling the explanatory
gap between QG and GR (by solving the easy and hard problems, or
explaining why the hard problem does not appear). In this paper, we
undertake the second step.
Third, it is common, when examining this issue, to jump into the
philosophical literature on emergence in order to make sense of space-
time emergence. But our present goal is different since we aim at
narrowing the explanatory gap between GR and QG—not at offering
a philosophical analysis of the inter-theoretical relation obtaining be-
tween the two theories, or of the building relation obtaining between
the non-spatio-temporal structure and GR spacetime. In fact, it might
even be that there is no explanatory gap between spatio-temporal and
non-spatio-temporal features left at the end of the day, in such a way
that the novel features of QG with respect to GR should not be re-
lated to spacetime. To put it differently, the way we propose to narrow
the gap may mean that there is no need to appeal to the notion of
spacetime emergence, or alternatively, that the kind of emergence in-
volved in spacetime emergence is weaker than is usually thought. In
any case, our work is logically anterior to any analysis of emergence
or spacetime emergence.
In section 2, we argue that GR may be interpreted as a non-spatio-
temporal theory in an interesting sense. In section 3, we argue that
substantive features of space and time are still present in most ap-
proaches to QG and discuss possible counter-examples. We close in
section 4 with conclusions and outlook.
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2 GR as a Non-Spatiotemporal The-
ory
2.1 The Fundamental Spacetime Asymmetry
An essential feature of what we call “spacetime” is that there is an
asymmetry between what is called “time” and what is called “space”.
By this asymmetry we do not mean the notion of an arrow of time,
or of a flow of time. Most of our best microphysical theories are for-
mulated with respect to space and time but do not at all favour one
direction in time over the other4, or refer to a flow. We refer to a fact
even more basic. Generally, we take it that the asymmetry between
space and time in relativistic worlds—whether classically or quantum
mechanically described—is captured by their local Lorentzian nature.5
To be clear, we do not take the existence of an asymmetry in time to
be constitutive of an asymmetry between space and time, we rather
consider the more primitive existence, locally, of an asymmetry be-
tween the three spatial dimensions and the temporal dimension, an
asymmetry represented in our current best physical theories mathe-
matically by Lorentz symmetry.
The reader might object that the split between space and time is
not necessarily captured by Lorentz symmetry even in our best physi-
cal theories. An alternative possibility is that it is rather captured by
the causal structure of these theories.6 It is useful here to distinguish
between the relativistic and the quantum gravitational cases. In the
relativistic case, the local split between space and time can equiva-
lently be seen as encoded either by (local) Lorentz symmetry, or by a
(local) causal structure. This is because—in a relativistic context—
the local lightcone structure is tantamount to locally Lorentz invariant
dynamics. Which side to stress seems somewhat unimportant to us
since our interest here is in the codification of the split (and not in its
“true” origin). Prioritising Lorentz symmetry over the causal struc-
ture may seem to suggest that the source of Lorentz symmetry is not
the causal structure of spacetime. However, we do not wish to imply
4Arguably, the weak interaction—as part of the standard model and thus of our best
microphysical theories—is not invariant under time-reversal. We would like to thank
an anonymous referee for pressing us on pointing this out. Note though that (1) it is
highly non-standard to consider the macroscopic arrow of time to be grounded in the
weak interaction’s violation of time-reversal symmetry (for discussion, see for instance
Price (1997), Wallace (2013)); and that (2) the weak interaction remains invariant under
CPT-transformation—a generalized notion of time-reversal.
5This is explicated in more detail below, including considerations of caveats.
6We want to thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
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that this is the case. We remain neutral on the source of the split—we
simply identify the existence of spacetime, in a minimal sense, with
the existence of such a split.
Regarding the quantum gravitational case, let us stress that we do
not have a problem with taking (as in the case of causal set theory, see
section 3.1) the split between the quasi-spatial and the quasi-temporal
structures to be for instance encoded by a primitive graph structure
(call it “causal”), and not by (a representation of) the Lorentz (sym-
metry) group. Our stress really is on the persistence of a split between
quasi-spatial and quasi-temporal structures in quantum gravity, not
on its needing to be realized through a representation of Lorentz sym-
metry (or a close-by relative for that matter).
As we see it, the claim that spacetime is not fundamental may
amount to two claims: First, that operational spacetime—namely the
ordering structure of the universe, as we may partly operationalize
it through rods, clocks and even our perceptions—is not the rock-
bottom ordering structure of the world.7 Second, that theoretically-
loaded spacetime—namely the entity posited in the standard geomet-
rical formulation of GR in order to make sense of what we measure
operationally—does not exist. What we will argue for in this section
is that the (heavily) theoretically-loaded spacetime of the standard ge-
ometrical interpretation of GR may be regarded as already missing in
GR, easing the way for the possibility to narrow the gap between GR
and QG.
2.2 The Non-Fundamentality of Spacetime in
GR
Spacetime in GR (and already in Special Relativity, SR hereafter)
very visibly differs from space and time as we find them in Newtonian
physics since there is no absolute simultaneity anymore. However,
several ordinary intuitions about space and time are preserved (such
as a partial ordering of spatio-temporal events), in such a way that SR
and GR are not generally presented as entailing that space and time
do not exist, but rather as implying that our pre-relativistic and pre-
theoretic beliefs about space and time are deceptive to some extent.
GR is a specific spacetime theory based on a 4-dimensional differen-
tiable manifold, which has fields on top, namely a symmetric rank-two
tensor, the metric g of Lorentzian signature8, and other fields T1, ..., Tn
7See Menon (forthcoming) for a similar notion.
8As a matter of convention, the signature is either (3, 1) or (1, 3). Note that requiring
the metric signature to be Lorentzian amounts to requiring g to be locally Poincare´ invari-
ant, and vice versa, as both correspond to the fact that—at each point—g can be brought
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(usually called matter fields—provided that they contribute to the so-
called energy momentum tensor T ; see for instance Lehmkuhl (2011)).
The g field is subject to the so-called Einstein field equation, which
amounts to equating the Einstein field tensor Gab := Rab − 12Rgab
to the energy momentum tensor such that Gab = 8piTab. The fields
themselves are subject to dynamical equations, which are formulated
by means of derivatives defined via gab.
As Read (2017a) points out, this does not define GR as it is often
implicitly presented, though: in the set-up, the matter fields do not
have to be (locally) Poincare´ covariant. This is however necessary—
albeit not sufficient—to obtain the often desired behaviour of matter
as looking locally Minkowskian in at least some minimal sense. In
this spirit, the strong equivalence principle a` la Brown, Read and
Lehmkuhl—SEPRead-Brown-Lehmkuhl from now on—demands that the
dynamical equations of the matter fields are locally invariant under
(passive) Poincare´ transformation.9,10 In other words, without further
qualification on the matter fields (such as SEPRead-Brown-Lehmkuhl), the
dynamical equations of certain matters fields in GR might for instance
be locally Galilean invariant (and not Lorentz invariant). The dy-
namical approach, however, embraces such a broad conception of GR
where certain matter field types are not excluded on purely a priori
grounds.11
into the form of the Minkowskian metric. (Note that the derivatives and higher derivatives
of g at this point will generically not vanish.) In the following, we will thus accept that
the claim that spacetime is Lorentzian—in having Lorentzian signature—is (extension-
ally) equivalent to the claim that g is locally Poincare´ invariant. Furthermore, whenever a
spacetime is locally Poincare´ invariant/Lorentzian, it will also be locally Lorentz invariant.
9See Read et al. (2018, p. 6), for a detailed explication.
10Note, though, that the stronger demand that matter “behaves” locally like in
Minkowski spacetime in the sense that the matter equations locally take the same form
as in Minkowski spacetime (also referred to as a strong equivalence principle by Brown
(2005)) cannot be satisfied, at least in the standard conception: This has recently been
stressed by Read et al. (2018) as second order dynamical equations (such as the Maxwell
wave equations in curved spacetime) do not even, at a point, take the same form as in flat
spacetime. Such a strong equivalence principle should not serve as a postulate of GR as
it would generally not even hold at a point for quite familiar matter theories such as elec-
tromagnetism. We can thus conclude—as for instance Knox (2013) or Read et al. (2018)
do—that this form of strong equivalence principle can generally only hold approximately,
when curvature effects are negligible.
11Note that even if the SEPRead-Brown-Lehmkuhl does not hold, the same space-time split
could arguably still be implemented by matter fields whose equations of motion are locally
invariant under (passive) Galilean symmetry. Matter fields with rather abnormal local
symmetry properties (without any symmetry properties) might however give rise to a
split incompatible with that of a Lorentzian metric and locally Lorentz invariant matter
fields (might not implement a split at all).
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As above, the theory of GR is usually depicted in textbooks in
its manifest geometric description (after all, differential geometry is
the language of relativity). However, this is not the only presentation
of GR; one should for instance take note of the particle physicist’s
approach to GR, originally going back to Arnowitt et al. (1962) and
Deser (1970), but also quite prominently put forward by Feynman
and Weinberg (sometimes called the “massless spin-2 approach”).12
The classical13 spin-2 view featuring the (classical) linearized metric
field in a Minkowski background space reproduces GR without any
import from quantum physics. The story is simple (albeit not fully
uncontroversial—see the debate between Padmanabhan (2008) and
Pitts and Schieve (2007) which we take to have been decided for Pitts
eventually and thus in favour of the classical spin-2 view): Due to the
self-coupling properties of the linearized field the linearized field will
eventually give rise to a new field—the metric field g familiar from GR
and subject to the Einstein field equation. It is interesting to wonder
about the status of the Minkowski spacetime background structure
once the metric field has been built. Two options seem straightfor-
ward: One could for instance consider it to be a genuine background
spacetime, or simply regard it as a “glorious non-entity” (see Brown
and Pooley (2006))—as done in what is called the dynamical approach
to SR: The Minkowski spacetime has no (fundamental) ontological sta-
tus but is derivative on symmetry properties of the (matter) fields (see
Brown (2005) for more details).
One might object that such a field view of GR (in which the grav-
itational degrees of freedom are in a sense treated on par with that of
other interactions) is only granted if we subscribe to a vantage point
external to GR—as the quantum field theoretic spin-2 view. At the
same time, we promised a putative partial disappearance of spacetime
within GR—how does this all square? It turns out that a fields-only
view can exactly be found in the context of GR alone—namely in the
dynamical approach to GR (cf. Brown (2005)). But let us proceed
step by step: We first present GR as it is usually understood in physics
and then turn to its possible philosophical interpretations, especially
highlighting the dynamical approach to GR.
Now, the standard interpretation of GR is the geometric view
(building on its usual geometric presentation), often taken so much
12For a philosophical account of the spin-2 view, see Salimkhani (2017).
13The quantum spin-2 approach turns a classical field perspective into a quantum field
theory perspective: GR and many of its properties (universal coupling, minimal coupling,
...) are interpreted as a low-energy limit from a higher vantage point—the theory of
quantum field theory. In this sense then, the particle physicist’s approach to GR is not an
approach to GR simpliciter but to perturbatively quantized GR and only thereby to GR.
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for granted that one generically does not even talk about interpreting
GR. The geometric view can be spelled out as the view that g necessar-
ily has chronogeometric significance, namely is necessarily identified
with spacetime.14 In other words, the metric g has chronogeometric
significance in any GR model, which is to say that there can be rods
and clocks which (at least approximately) give measurement results of
spatio-temporal distances, provided that the circumstances allow for
it.
In contrast to the geometric view, the dynamical approach to GR
(see Brown (2005)) sees matters the other way around: The fields are
there, realizing structures like rods and clocks, and the question is
why they happen to give results in accordance with the metric field
structure. From the dynamical perspective, the chronogeometric sig-
nificance of g is thus not automatic, in the sense that it is a contingent
fact that we happen to live in a world in which g has this chronogeo-
metric significance.
According to the dynamical approach, the operational spatio-
temporal significance of the so-called metric field is contingent. But
does this view not entail an anti-realist conception of spacetime then?
Not necessarily. Indeed, the dynamical approach builds on the strong
conviction that the term “spacetime” should refer to that to which our
operations of measuring space and time refer (cf. the defense of space-
time functionalism in Knox (2013)). At this point, one might want
to object that the metric field g could have an operational spatio-
temporal significance if and only if spacetime is genuinely fundamen-
tal. However, we believe it is important to keep in mind the distinction
between two notions of spacetime that we made before: An opera-
tionalist notion of spacetime corresponding to what clocks and rods
(would) measure, and a notion describing a richer theoretically-loaded
physical structure. We take the main lesson of the dynamical view15
to be that operational aspects of spacetime can exist in absence of any
theoretically-loaded notion of spacetime.
Now, the dynamical approach helps with narrowing the explana-
tory gap as we only need to explain the existence of an operational
14For more nuanced characterizations, see Read (2017a) and Menon (2017). This is by
and large what Read (2017a) calls the “modal geometric view”.
15The same holds for what Read (2017a) calls the “individualist geometric view”—the
view that a certain geometric structure has chronogeometric significance. Which geometric
structure this is is then a contingent fact, which depends on the concrete properties of
the possible world under consideration. In fact, this notion helps distinguishing between
the dynamical approach and the individualist geometrical view: According to the first,
operational spacetime contingently exists in the absence of any richer theoretically-loaded
spacetime, while according to the second, the operational spacetime corresponds to a
theoretically-loaded spacetime, the existence of both being contingent.
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spacetime:
1. The way the metric field is typically seen to couple to the matter
fields (“minimal coupling”) is a contingent fact (the coupling
behaviour for instance directly changes once one accepts rather
exotic matter fields). This sort of contingency suggests that the
existence of spacetime is an accident.16
2. Recovering GR spacetime from QG, in the framework of the dy-
namical approach, only means recovering operationalist space-
time, that is—more or less—this specific coupling behaviour of
one field to all other fields.17
3. Coming from QG, we only need to explain why the fundamental
ontology (described by QG), leads to this particular derivative
ontology—namely to the metric field being specifically coupled
to the other fields. Thereby, we are not assuming from the start
the existence of an independent structure called “spacetime”.
4. In other words, we do not need to recover all theoretically-loaded
features of spacetime that we can attribute to the notion of space-
time in order to explain spacetime emergence but only opera-
tionalist spacetime. This narrows the explanatory gap.18
What matters here is that this operationalist notion of spacetime
remains highly flexible with respect to the existence of various aspects
of spacetime, if any, that we could want to ascribe to spacetime. This
operationalist notion heavily rests on distinguishing locally between
space and time, something, we shall see in the second part of the pa-
per, that is still the case in most approaches to QG. This is interesting
for the problem of spacetime since many striking features of spacetime
(say, its particular ordering of events) are said to be described by GR
and missing in QG, or vice versa. If this is true that GR “space-
time” is more an operational than a theoretical notion, as signaled by
16More precisely, the view is held that the chronogeometric significance of the metric
field (and thus its status as spacetime) is only earned if the symmetries of the matter
fields coincide with that of the metric field. In the case of GR, this would mean that
the dynamical equations of the matter fields need to be locally invariant under (passive)
Poincare´ transformation (the SEPRead-Brown-Lehmkuhl needs to be fulfilled). Even that
the SEPRead-Brown-Lehmkuhl holds, is arguably not sufficient for chronogeometricity of the
metric field, as only recently argued for by Menon et al. (2018).
17We only need to recover operationalist spacetime, and this operationalist spacetime
is consistent with both the geometrical and the dynamical approach. But the dynamical
approach posits less behind the operationalist spacetime: it posits a contingent field, when
the geometrical approach posits a necessary structure.
18Arguably, this operationalist move relates closely to how Lam and Wu¨thrich (forth-
coming) suggest narrowing the explanatory gap through a functionalist notion of space-
time.
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the very existence of the debate between geometrical and dynamical
proponents, then the explanatory gap is reduced by by deflating the
existence of specific spatio-temporal features of the metric field.
Note that operating in the context of QG, the geometrical versus
dynamical debate should not be interpreted as being about the ontol-
ogy of the actual world. In particular, these interpretations should not
be regarded as aimed at answering to the following question: What is
the correct ontological interpretation of GR? Rather, since the goal is
to reduce GR to QG and to deny that some conceptual specificity of
GR is irreducible to QG, there is no point in asking which of the geo-
metrical or the dynamical approach is true per se. Rather, our point
is that the dynamical formulation of GR might be more easily related
to the real ontology of the world described by QG. In other words, the
dynamical approach, by offering a way out with respect to the hard
problem of spacetime might offer a useful interpretation of GR, being
granted that only the correct interpretation of the most fundamental
physical theory could actually deliver an ultimate accurate ontological
description of the physical world.
Independently of the discussion above, the very fact that the dy-
namical approach eases the resolution of the problem of spacetime
emergence in the context of QG might count as a reason to accept
it. Indeed, the extension of the explanatory gap between GR and QG
relies on the extension of the explanatory gap between the primitive
notions of the two theories. If the traditional philosophical reading
of the derivative theory (here GR) may be replaced by another read-
ing of GR (here the dynamical approach) in order to get primitive
notions in the derivative theory that are in line with the primitive no-
tions of the fundamental theory, then the new reading of the deriva-
tive theory constitutes a new path in the resolution of the problem
of spacetime emergence. More precisely, this move simplifies the easy
problem of spacetime emergence by eliminating the primitive notions
in the derivative theory that are too different from the primitive no-
tions of the fundamental theory (thereby simplifying the finding of
the bridge principles between the two sets of primitive notions); more
importantly, this elimination also offers a way out of the hard prob-
lem of spacetime emergence by denying the existence of any important
conceptual discrepancy between the two sets of primitive notions.
At the end of this section, a word of caution is in order: Since
we offer in the next section another road for the downsizing of the
conceptual discrepancy between GR and QG, the possibility to ease
the resolution of the problem of spacetime emergence may not be
counted as a strong argument in favor of the dynamical approach
but only as an interesting attribute of the dynamical approach. Our
12
claim is merely that the dynamical approach leads to one possible
and interesting road in the resolution of the problem(s) of spacetime
emergence.
3 QG as Spatial and Temporal
In this section, we point out that (local) Lorentz symmetry or at
least some codification of a local difference between (quasi-)space and
(quasi-)time is a decisive feature of current QG approaches. From
our point of view, this shows first that spacetime emergence could,
in principle, be more radical than what we actually find in current
approaches to QG, and second that the explanatory gap between the
fundamental non-spatio-temporal structure and the derivative spatio-
temporal structure is not as deep as what is usually thought: the
promising QG theories we are aware of embed a local distinction into
their basic structure between entities that may be traced back to the
space-time split in GR.
3.1 The Local Split Criterion in QG
The Lorentz group features prominently in our two best physical
frameworks: In GR, matter fields standardly used are locally Lorentz
invariant (that is, fulfill the SEPRead-Brown-Lehmkuhl as introduced be-
fore), and of the metric field (at every point p in spacetime, a co-
ordinate system xµ can be found19 such that the spacetime met-
ric gµν(p) = ηµν(p), and ηµν(p) will be invariant under Lorentz-
transformations). In QFT, Lorentz transformations act as a symme-
try on states through corresponding unitary representations: Different
fields are linked to different kinds of unitary representations.
In both QFT and GR (local) Lorentz symmetry encodes major
properties of what there is: Within QFT, fields—and thereby mat-
ter types—can be categorized in terms of which representation of the
Lorentz group—or more accurately the larger Poincare´ group—they
transform under: A scalar field is said to have spin 0, a vector field spin
1, the metric field spin 2, ... The crucial aspect of local Lorentz symme-
try is that it reflects a difference between space on the one hand, and
time on the other hand. But local Lorentz symmetry also makes con-
nection to time by serving as a necessary criterion for chronogeometry
in the (general) relativistic context : the (locally Lorentz invariant) g
metric would not earn its usual chronogeometric significance if not all
19However, derivatives (including higher derivatives) of g at this point will in general
not vanish.
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other matter equations of motion were locally Lorentz-invariant (con-
sider for instance the case of partly Galilean-invariant matter equa-
tions). After all, the reason why a clock made from any sort of matter
field can, to some degree, read out the worldline interval as time is
that these matter fields behave as in local Minkowskian spacetime,
which requires at least local Lorentz symmetry (cf. for instance Brown
(2005)).
It should be stressed that, at this date, no sign of Lorentz violation
has been detected (cf. Mattingly (2005)). A putative violation of
(local) Lorentz symmetry would be expected to occur—if at all—in
two ways: First, through the existence of a preferred observer/fixed
background structure or alike (violation of the relativity principle),
and second in the form of a deformation of the Lorentzian algebra.20
Whereas the latter is surely interesting21, it is not at all as radical
as the former, which would imply a loss of democracy of observers
(see in particular section 6 of Read et al. (2018) for two very accurate
examples of this kind).
Now, Lorentz symmetry encodes a distinction between space and
time.22 Any theory which starts with Lorentz symmetry of some kind
cannot underlie what we would call a highly radical emergence of space
and time. We do not want to compare quantitatively various kinds
of emergence, though; we only point out that this emergence could
be said to be more radical than what we find on the QG market for
the following reason: All of these approaches keep a local distinction
between something quasi-spatial and something quasi-temporal. In-
sofar as the elimination of this local distinction between space and
time is a logical possibility, we conclude that a much more radical sce-
nario would be possible if any split in the basal theory that could be
mapped onto the structural space-time split of the derivative theory
was eliminated.
We noted before that the (local) Lorentz symmetry of fields plays a
decisive role in GR and QFT in encoding the split between space and
time. Now, if a certain feature plays a similar role in the fundamental
theory—i.e. in encoding a local split between something quasi-spatial
and something quasi-temporal—and since it might differ substantively
20Call a family of Lie algebras (A)≥0 a (continuous) deformation of the Lie algebra A′
if, for  = 0, A′ = A0. For a detailed technical discussion of how for instance the Lorentz
algebra gets deformed into the algebra of Doubly-Relativity, see for instance Kowalski-
Glikman (2005).
21Consider for instance the program of doubly special relativity (cf. Amelino-Camelia
(2002)).
22A similar observation has already been made with respect to Lorentz signature by
(Callender, 2017, ch.6).
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from Lorentz symmetry, we will refer to this feature as “locally split”
or as the existence of a local split, and refer to the associated criterion
as the local split criterion.
3.2 The Quasi-Spatial/Quasi-Temporal Split
in QG
In this subsection, we illustrate in what sense the most standard ap-
proaches to QG23 build on a difference between something quasi-
temporal and something quasi-spatial. As we shall see, these ap-
proaches to QG already include a split between two elements which—
upon applying an appropriate reduction scheme24 for obtaining GR—
will become associated with space and time respectively.
There are different ways to categorise approaches: For instance,
one could purely proceed in a technical manner, that is in terms of
whether the approach rests on quantization of GR in some sense or
not, and if so, whether this is done canonically or covariantly. Or
to take another example, one might examine whether perturbative
or non-perturbative formulations are used. Finally, one might distin-
guish approaches on a purely conceptual basis—namely, in terms of
what kind of principles are used. QG approaches might for instance be
sorted based on their major guiding principles such as UV completion
(asymptotic safety), discreteness (causal set theory), restoration of
unitarity (Horava-Lifshitz gravity), etc. (Which guiding principle(s)
should count as major in an approach, is of course not always un-
controversial.) For our purposes, it is however useful to categorize
approaches by whether Lorentz symmetry or another feature play-
ing the same role obtains. After all, as we have already seen before,
the standard representation of the Lorentz symmetry group in a four-
dimensional setting explicitly contains an asymmetry with respect to
how one dimension is treated. More generally, independently of its
group-theoretical representation, the Lorentz group has an in-built
asymmetry—already expressed by its standard notation Lorentz(1, 3).
When sorting approaches in terms of whether a local split feature
obtains, we only find two cases: (1) Lorentz symmetries do obtain (in
terms of usage of unitary representations of the Lorentzian group), (2)
the local split is expressed through another principle. For a compre-
23We follow the selection of QG approaches in textbooks such as Kiefer (2007) as to
what counts as standard.
24Generally, this is expected to involve approximation (as coarse-graining) and limit
operations (as the quantum-to-classical transition), see Butterfield and Isham (1999) and
Butterfield and Isham (2001).
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hensive25 categorization see table 1.
Concerning (1), let us quickly go through the major approaches to
QG in which the Lorentz symmetry group plays a central role:
Perturbative GR might be best described as the straightforward
particle physics approach to QG for which the spacetime metric g
is linearized around a Minkowski background metric, its linear fluc-
tuations being treated and quantized as any other field within a
Minkowski background spacetime (basically the quantum spin-2 ap-
proach already depicted in footnote 13).26 Subsequently, higher and
higher curvature corrections to the linear expansion are considered,
and quantized as well. The resulting theory is usually expected to
only hold as an effective field theory, namely under imposition of an
energy cut-off. As a consequence, such a theory is not predictive up to
arbitrary energy scales, as with any increase of the cut-off energy, new
parameters need to be added for determining the interaction strengths
featuring in the theory (the values of these parameters can only be
obtained through experiment). This lack of predictivity—is generally
regarded as turning perturbative GR into an unsatisfactory candidate
for a theory of quantum gravity. There are however also hints at the
theory’s UV completeness, namely that it does after all hold (at least
formally) up to arbitrarily high energies (as promoted by proponents
of asymptotic safety).
Similarly, standard perturbative string theory amounts to treat-
ing strings (and higher dimensional objects than the two-dimensional
worldsheets of strings) in a Minkowski (or some other) background
spacetime geometry—the so-called target space. Importantly, in both
perturbative GR and perturbative string theory, the Lagrangian is
constructed in such a way as to obey local Lorentz invariance or
typically even full Lorentz invariance (given the prominent status of
Minkowski spacetime as a background spacetime in these approaches).
Loop Quantum Gravity is a quantization approach to GR and ex-
ists in both a canonical and a covariant version (which are arguably
two approaches—two different perspectives—of the same theory). See
Rovelli and Vidotto (2014). In covariant loop QG, the resulting
spinfoam structure—loosely speaking a granulation of 4d-spacetime
structure—is (explicitly) locally Lorentz-invariant. Each element of
the spin foam state structure—its vertices and edges—covariantly
25We do not aim at comprehensiveness in a very broad sense including any approach
available on the quantum gravity market, but only at comprehensiveness with respect to
the standard list of approaches as dealt with in textbooks as Kiefer (2007).
26One might also choose a different fixed background metric for this. Given the extreme
technical and conceptual challenges linked to QFT in curved spacetime, this route is
however rarely taken.
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transforms under Lorentz transformation in an appropriate represen-
tation (see Rovelli and Speziale (2011); for a critical view on this take,
see Gambini and Pullin (2014)).27
Concerning (2): (a) Causal dynamical triangulation is a quantiza-
tion approach to GR which aims at evaluating the path integral of the
classical Einstein-Hilbert action over discrete spacetime geometries
first, before taking a continuum limit for the coarse-graining length
linked to the discrete spacetime geometries. If this continuum limit
is meaningful, quantum GR has a UV fixed point—which is what is
argued for within the asymptotic safety approach to QG.28 In this ap-
proach, the local split is obtained through the discretization scheme
that is used; we will say more on this below.
Indeed, not even summation over discrete spacetime geometries
turns out to be technically straightforward: Already at the continu-
ous level (before discretization), one thus introduces further restric-
tions. One imposes the so-called causality condition which states that
“only those histories for which the final three-geometry lies wholly in
the future of the initial one” (p.10, italics by Go¨rlich) contribute in
the path integral summation central to this approach. By this, CDT
limits itself to summing over discretized globally hyperbolic space-
time geometries which—this is an additional restriction—have to be
topologically invariant across foliation slices.
The discretization rests on a specific form of four-dimensional tri-
angulation procedure (causal triangulation): The edge lengths in tem-
poral direction and those in spatial directions are required to be op-
posed to each other—namely a2t = αa
2
i with α < 0 where at is the
length of a temporal edge and ai that of a spatial edge (measured
in terms of an Euclidean background metric). The discretized ge-
ometry can be understood as a simplicial manifold, which consists of
piecewise linear spaces corresponding to the faces of the 4d-triangles.
The curvature of continuous spacetime can then be modelled by how
these 4d-triangles meet at their joints. Importantly for our topic, an
asymmetry between spatial (ai) and temporal (at) is imposed into the
discretization scheme at every level, which—importantly—should not
be expected to vanish in the continuum limit.
27In the last years, a close relative to covariant LQG—Group field theory (GFT)—gained
momentum. In fact, from the viewpoint of GFT, GFT is seen as the non-perturbative con-
tinuation of so far only perturbative covariant LQG. Interestingly, the special emphasis
on the presence of the Lorentz group as fundamental group structure is even more pro-
nounced in GFT than in covariant LQG: A complex group field φ in GFT is a map from
D copies of a group manifold G into the complex numbers, i.e. φ : Gx...xG → C) where
G is standardly taken to be the Lorentz group.
28The following paragraph largely follows Go¨rlich (2011).
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(b) Causal set theory (CST) is inspired from a theorem by Mala-
ment (1977) according to which the formal metric structure in GR can
be split up into a continuous causal structure on the one hand, and
local volume information on the other hand. Assuming that spacetime
structure will be discrete in the quantum realm, the crude idea behind
CST is then to model the structure underlying GR spacetime through
a causal graph for which local volume information—relevant at lower
energy scales, and the limit to GR—can be obtained through a simple
counting procedure of nodes (a region made up of N nodes should
more or less display a volume proportional to N). In this approach
then, spacetime is modelled as a causal set—a set of featureless events
equipped with a finite partial ordering structure.29 The events are di-
rectly understood as spacetime events, and the partial order relation
is supposed to cash out the causality relations known from GR—in
particular Malament’s theorem (for a philosophical account and ref-
erences to the original literature see Wu¨thrich (2012); Wu¨thrich and
Callender (2017)).
Now, a causal set—being a discrete structure—can hardly be said
to feature Lorentz symmetry as a property.30 Although CST does
not display any sort of Lorentz symmetry, it implements a local split
through its causal structure—allowing for locally distinguishing be-
tween (quasi-)space and (quasi-)time.
Some care is needed here: CST is a subtle case in that this ap-
proach is often associated with a “growing block interpretation” (see
e.g. Wu¨thrich and Callender (2017))—the view that what evolves is
not space but spacetime. However, even if we subscribe to a grow-
ing block interpretation of CST, the local split should be conceived of
as obtaining between (quasi-)space and (quasi-)time and not between
(quasi-)spacetime and (quasi-)time. Indeed, given that the local split
is associated with the internal “causal” structure of the causal set (the
structure obtained with the application the partial ordering relation
to the nodes), it must obtain between (quasi-)space and (quasi-)time.
In any case, and independently of whether the split should be best
thought of as obtaining between (quasi-)spacetime and (quasi-)time,
or (quasi-)space and (quasi-)time, our point remains that CST exem-
plifies a local split between two structures.
Therefore, all the candidates for a theory of QG include a difference
between something quasi-temporal and something quasi-spatial. More
29A partial order is a finite partial order iff, if two events stand in that partial ordering
relation, then there must be a finite number of events standing in a partial ordering relation
in between them.
30All of what its proponents claim is that it eventually allows for recovering Lorentzian
invariant structure.
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Split between quasi-temporal and quasi-spatial Approaches
(1) encoded by Lorentz symmetry perturbative GR
perturbative string theory (target
space is locally Lorentz invariant)
asymptotic safety
covariant LQG
(2) not encoded by Lorentz symmetry
... through a discretization scheme causal dynamical triangulation
... through a partial order causal set theory
... through foliation prior to quantization canonical QG/canonical loop QG
Table 1: Status of the space-time split in different approaches
precisely, they all feature some sort of split that maps onto—or could
in principle map onto—the split between space and time present in
GR. However, a more fundamental theory underlying GR could lack,
in principle, a form of asymmetry between space and time. Indeed,
we do not defend that the split between space and time is an a pri-
ori constraint on the nature of the world. Rather, we observe that
our theories, based on empirical evidence and rational theorizing, and
aimed at describing the actual physical world, always embed such a
split.
Focusing on a classical Euclidean space, as a toy model, opens a
window on the conceptual problems that occur in a possible world
lacking an inbuilt local asymmetry between space and time. Set up
fields and equations on an Euclidean space: The local metric field
then takes the form δab in suitable coordinates, and the signature is
(4, 0).31 The equations of motion are then locally invariant under
Euclidean transformations. Now, assume that this can be done such
that a local Cauchy problem is well-defined even if the global problem
is not well-posed–as has been argued for by Read (2017b). How could
a direction, at any point—either at the fundamental level or at some
higher level—get marked as a special one? At some point, we must
make contact with the physical theories that apply at higher levels.
And these theories, after all, do involve such a split. But again, take
note that we do not claim that “split free worlds” are impossible but
only that these would be radically non-spatio-temporal. Indeed, we
would lack the resources to distinguish, even locally, between space
and time.32
31Or (0, 4), depending on the convention.
32In this context, it might also be worth mentioning the Euclidean-Lorentzian signa-
ture scenario occurring in certain applications of LQG to cosmology (cf. Bojowald and
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3.3 Further Decisive Features of QG
In contrast to the local split criterion, the following features are as a
matter of fact often said to emerge, quite radically, from QG (cf. for
instance Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013)): classicality out of superposi-
tion, continuity out of discreteness, a GR structure out of a differently
ordered structure (a sort of “geometrical deviation” or “disordered lo-
cality”33), or a 4D out of a higher dimensional or lower dimensional
structure. Although we agree that these conceptual discrepancies are
of a radical nature, actually none of these cases threaten the existence
of a local distinction between (quasi-)space and (quasi-)time. Let us
have a look at the missing features in QG in order to see that they
remain consistent with a local distinction between (quasi-)space and
(quasi-)time in GR.
Classicality out of superposition One might think that our pic-
ture of GR spacetime radically changes once GR spacetime as a
whole is subject to quantum evolution. These approaches (call
them quantum GR approaches) either (1) build on a foliation of
GR spacetimes into spacelike slices (known as the ADM formu-
lation of GR)34 and then treat the resulting GR-space as subject
to a quantum evolution (canonical approach) involving evolution
into superposition states35, or (2) directly quantize GR space-
time in a covariant fashion (covariant procedure).36
The first case—the evolution of GR-space into superpositions—
does not strike us as more bizarre than the generic evolution of
the non-spatial spin-up state into a superposition of a spin-up
and a spin-down state, i.e. |↑〉 (t0)→ (α |↑〉+ β |↓〉)(t) for t > t0.
The second case—the evolution of GR spacetime—can be con-
ceived of in terms of transition amplitudes37 between GR space-
time slices again (see Rovelli and Vidotto (2014)). Instead of
a determinate evolution as in the classical case, there is now
Brahma (2016); Brahma (forthcoming); see also Huggett and Wu¨thrich (forthcoming) for a
philosophical discussion). The signature of the derivative “spacetime” near singularities—
including black hole singularities and the Big Bang singularity—is Euclidean and thus
non-Lorentzian. However, since these Euclidean regions are connected to Lorentzian re-
gions, what comes under attack here is not the existence of a local split between space
and time (encoded by a Lorentzian structure), but the universality of this split—namely,
the fact that it applies everywhere in the cosmos.
33See e.g. Markopoulou and Smolin (2007).
34This requires restriction to globally hyperbolic GR spacetimes.
35Canonical QG and loop QG belong to this category.
36This is standardly done by some kind of path integral formulation (cf. CDT and
covariant loop QG).
37This arguably amounts to a specific stance in the measurement problem already.
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a probabilistic evolution from one slice to another—a situation
which does not strike us as particularly conceptually challenging
either.
Continuity out of discreteness Certain approaches of QG imply
that the fundamental structure corresponding to “spacetime” is
discrete: It is generally assumed that this is the case for LQG and
causal set theory. It is quite trivial that the discrete/continuous
correspondence is a problem of its own, with no particular conse-
quence on the existence of an asymmetry between quasi-spatial
and quasi-temporal structures. This possible emergence of a
spacetime feature (continuity) out of a non-spatio-temporal fea-
ture (discreteness), therefore, remains independent of the even
more crucial feature of spacetime that we discuss, namely the lo-
cal asymmetry. Furthermore, asymptotic safety is at least com-
patible with a minimal physical length (see Percacci and Vacca
(2010)). But, note that this discreteness might only be of oper-
ational nature. Indeed, it could turn out that this discreteness
is not ontological but only epistemological. The appearance of
discreteness could arise from our mathematical tools, or from
theoretical limitations, in the case of LQG, if LQG is not a final
fundamental theory of everything, which is a genuine possibility.
Indeed, unlike string theorists, proponents of LQG generally re-
gard their approach as aimed at formulating a theory of quantum
gravity proper, not necessarily a final theory of everything.
But if this is what is meant, then note that GR already implies
an operational minimal length in spacetimes in which the hoop
conjecture38 applies (which roughly states that any kind of lo-
calization of matter in a sufficiently small “hoop” leads to the
formation of black holes).
Disordered locality/Non-locality In LQG, some relations of ad-
jacency at the fundamental level correspond to large distance
relations at the classical level such that what is local at the
more fundamental level described by LQG does not need to di-
rectly correspond to something local at the classical level (see
for instance Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013)). But once again,
this feature is orthogonal to the existence (or non-existence) of
a local asymmetry between space and time. Indeed since the
asymmetry between quasi-spatial and quasi-temporal structures
is local, any feature regarding global features of the structure un-
der consideration will remain silent on this particular local fea-
ture. Furthermore, we might already be familiar with this kind
38Cf. Thorne (1995).
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of disordered locality through non-locality in quantum mechan-
ics, where locality at the level of the wave-function corresponds
to some non-locality—or non-separability—at the classical level.
Therefore disordered locality, even if afflicting the QG structure
corresponding to GR spacetime, remains consistent with a local
distinction between quasi-spatial and quasi-temporal structures.
However, other features in certain QG approaches seem to be rad-
ically different from those of GR spacetime. In these cases, it is hard
to see how exactly to erase the conceptual discrepancy. But, as we
shall see, albeit radical, these conceptual discrepancies are fairly less
radical than those induced by the non-existence of a local distinction
between space and time. Dimensional shift from the usual four space-
time dimensions is such a feature. String theory features additional
(compactified) dimensions. At first sight, they seem to be straightfor-
wardly integrable into our phenomenal conception of spacetime—they
are simply small and rolled up when zooming out. However, in string
theory, even the regular four dimensions might be—provided that they
are closed—subject to a duality (see Huggett (2017)). A duality is a
formal mapping between the spaces of solutions of two empirically
equivalent theories. Interestingly, it has been shown that different
string theories defining strings and branes on target spaces with dif-
ferent dimension compactification radius are dual in this sense. Du-
alities could thus possibly render the so-called target space on which
strings are defined in string theory quite different from our regular GR
spacetime—the dimensional shift would then amount to more than the
simple addition of some extra non-temporal dimensions.39
Other approaches like causal dynamical triangulation and asymp-
totic safety—even more problematically perhaps—predict that ran-
dom walkers will at higher and higher energy scales move in smaller
and smaller (including non-integer fractal) dimensions. Again, it is not
straightforwardly clear how to make sense of dimensional reduction.
However, take note that the sorts of dimensional shifts mentioned
here occur in settings with a presupposed distinction between space
and time. For this reason, we do not take the occurrence of dimen-
sional shifts per se to be in any sense as radical as that of an emergence
of a difference between something quasi-spatial and something quasi-
temporal.
At the end of the day, the dimensional shift does not bear the same
degree of radicality as a potential lack of distinction between some-
thing quasi-spatial and something quasi-temporal. Only the rejection
39For a discussion of the possible ontological interpretations of duality more generally
cf. for instance Le Bihan and Read (2018).
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of the local distinction between space and time would constitute a
maximally radical revision. But, as we have argued, all the main
approaches to QG accept a principle that does encode a local distinc-
tion between something quasi-spatial and something quasi-temporal—
namely a distinction between two structures that give rise to space and
time as we experience them and measure them with rods and clocks.
4 Conclusion
If one believes that there is a problematic discrepancy between the
spatio-temporal concepts used in the derivative spatio-temporal the-
ory and the non-spatio-temporal concepts used in the fundamental
non-spatio-temporal theory, one should be interested in privileging the
dynamical interpretation of GR spacetime. Indeed, this move narrows
significantly the explanatory gap between the two theories, by treat-
ing spacetime as being already partially missing in GR. Furthermore,
after examining the most popular approaches to QG, we do not find
the conceptual discrepancy between GR and the various approaches
of QG to be substantive enough to prevent, in principle, a reduction
of GR to QG. Insofar as QG embeds a local distinction between two
distinct and local quasi-spatial and quasi-temporal structures, this
ensures—at least in principle—the possibility to recover the familiar
space-time split in relativistic physics from these local separations in
the fundamental structure.
Finally, let us conclude with a remark on the relationship between
the two moves presented in this paper. In the first part, we argued
that, according to the dynamical approach to GR, the chronogeo-
metric significance of the metric in GR is contingent. The reasoning
involved however standardly rests on that the equations of motion of
a matter field in GR do not need to be locally Poincare´ (and thus not
Lorentz) invariant. However, this permissiveness may appear, at first
glance, to be in tension with the second part of the paper in which
we saw that Lorentz symmetry is a generic property all approaches
to quantum gravity. Rather than concluding that the two moves we
introduced are necessarily exclusive, one can simply stipulate a less
permissive version of the dynamical approach which requires all mat-
ter fields to be locally Poincare´ (and thus Lorentz) invariant. This is
possible if—as argued for by Menon et al. (2018)—the coincidence of
symmetries of the metric field and the symmetries of the matter fields
is not sufficient for the metric to have chronogeometric significance.
In any case, whether mutually compatible or exclusive, each of these
two moves eases the way for a narrowing of the explanatory gap be-
tween GR and QG. In a slogan, spacetime is already partially missing
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in GR, and/or still partially present in QG.
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